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Small-scale farming remains the main means of food pro-
duction globally, and the world’s rural populations depend
heavily on local land and natural resources and self-
subsistence (IAASTD, 2009; Godfray et al., 2010; Turner,
Lambin, & Reenberg, 2007; Wily, 2011a, 2011b). A lion’s
share of land they rely on is governed by customary, tradi-
tional, and indigenous systems of common property. In sub-
Saharan Africa, it has been estimated that 70% of this land
can be categorized as customary common property
(Deininger, 2003; Wily, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). However, since
about 2008, an emerging phenomenon of global large-scale
land acquisitions (LSLAs), popularly referred to as ‘‘global
land grabbing” (‘‘Buying Farmland Abroad: Outsourcing’s
Third Wave, 2009”), might be altering this picture. The
amount of land that has recently been acquired through
large-scale land deals in 63 low- and middle-income countries
has been conservatively estimated at 44 million hectares (The
Land Matrix, 2016). Several case studies and articles have
reported that LSLAs are occurring in the context of commu-
nal and traditional lands (De Schutter, 2011a; Fuys,
Mwangi, & Dohrn, 2008; Kugelman, 2012; Pearce, 2012;
Wily, 2011b), but whether LSLAs are preferentially targeting
communally owned lands remains unanswered.
The study of the agrarian transition driven by LSLAs faces
several methodological challenges related to the validity and
representativeness of the data. The Land Matrix (2016), a glo-
bal database on large-scale land acquisitions, has provided
useful information and triggered global studies and discussion,1but it does not provide in-depth information on fundamental
issues such as land tenure, actors and subjects involved, prior
land use, and the dynamics of the acquisition process. At the
other end of the spectrum, a number of publications collected
in different special issues have investigated LSLAs with an in-
depth case-study approach (e.g., Canadian Journal of
Development Studies, 2012; Development & Change, 2013;
Globalisations, 2013; The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2012;
Third World Quarterly, 2013). This body of literature, how-
ever, is still sparse and has a geographical bias.
To bridge the gap between global assessments and local in-
depth case studies approaches, we conducted a meta-study of
the scholarly literature on LSLA and land grabbing. Using
formal criteria, we selected 56 cases in 27 countries described
in 35 peer-reviewed articles. Using a combination of
political-economy and political-ecology theoretical perspec-
tives, we identified seven key variables that characterize the
acquisition dynamics of LSLAs, coded the selected cases,
2 WORLD DEVELOPMENTand explored the interactions between the variables. In this
way we sought to explore the hypothesis that LSLAs are hap-
pening at the expense of the commons, with particular atten-
tion to the actors, dynamics of acquisition, claims and
property rights conditions, land use and production changes,
power dynamics, and conflicts.
(a) The virtues VS the tragedy of the commons
The overexploitation of natural common-pool resources,
referred to as the ‘‘tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968),
is emblematic of many contemporary sustainability problems
that range from the need to meet primary human needs to glo-
bal environmental deterioration. In this context, an extensive
body of scholarship, well represented by the work of Ostrom
(1990) and colleagues, has demonstrated that community sys-
tems of production and subsistence societies are able to
develop effective self-governing institutions (Dietz, Ostrom,
& Stern, 2003) that achieve long-term sustainable use of their
natural resources (Berkes, Feeny, McCay, & Acheson, 1989;
Cox, Arnold, & Villamayor Toma´s, 2010; Ostrom, 1990).
While the degree of success or failure of common-property
systems varies (Berkes et al., 1989), empirical evidence has
shown that sustainable governance of the commons is possible
(Agrawal, 2001) and has highlighted the positive socio-
environmental features of these systems, including reduction
of the negative environmental effects of social inequality
(Andersson & Agrawal, 2011), perdurability of natural
resources (Agrawal, 2001; Berkes et al., 1989; Cox et al.,
2010), food security (Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Be´ne´,
Macfadyen, & Allison, 2007), irrigation effectiveness (Lam,
1999), institutional stability, and maintained ownership of
land (Deveroux, 2001). One of the characteristics of the suc-
cess of common-property systems is that local communities
can develop governing arrangements that are congruent with
local conditions (Ostrom, 1990). Traditional communities that
depend directly on the land and its resources have ethical
beliefs that promote environmental stewardship (Callicott,
1989; Chapin et al., 2010) and often develop adaptive manage-
ment practices based on traditional ecological knowledge that
can be more resilient to social and environmental disturbances
(Berkes, Folke, & Colding, 2000). However, common-
property systems might not have the institutional and political
instruments to deal with the dynamics of private LSLAs and
transnational land investments (De Schutter, 2011a;
D’Odorico & Rulli, 2014; Wily, 2011a, 2011b).
From a scientific point of view, the complexity of LSLAs
points to an emergent phenomenon relevant for the theory
of the commons: common-property systems that, according
to the literature, have the potential for high levels of resilience,
adaptive capacity, and sustainability might be systematically
undermined by the ongoing global land rush. The commons
literature has often focused on the local (endogenous) condi-
tions that characterize successful resource management. What
it has not extensively taken into account is the study of exter-
nal factors that can alter the functioning of well-rooted gover-
nance structures and processes. The exogenous process
denounced as ‘‘land grabbing” has the potential to disrupt suc-
cessful common-property systems and community resource
governance worldwide.
Despite the recognized role of insecure land tenure condi-
tions in the negotiation of land deals between agribusiness
investors and local actors and the threats that land grabbing
poses on the commons (German, Schoneveld, & Mwangi,
2013; Pearce, 2012; Wily, 2011a, 2011b), a systematic meta-
study of the relationship between LSLAs and the commonsis still missing. The assumption that the commons, its users,
and their traditional governance systems are negatively
affected by LSLAs is often made, but is usually based on a
few case studies.
(b) Defining commons grabbing
The term ‘‘commons” is not free from ambiguity, because it
is often used to refer both to resources and their governance
regimes (Ostrom et al., 2002). From the biophysical perspec-
tive, the commons or common-pool resources are difficult to
exclude (i.e., it is difficult to limit their appropriation or use)
and have high levels of subtractability (i.e., their use or appro-
priation by a person or a group of people reduces the ability of
others to benefit from them) (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker,
1994). From the governance perspective, building upon
Roman jurisprudence, institutional analysts have focused on
the ‘‘big four” categories of property systems and institutional
arrangements that can be associated with common-pool
resources: private, public, common property, and open access
(Cole & Ostrom, 2012). This categorical definition, however,
cannot be easily applied to real-world cases because institu-
tionally hybrid situations are generally diffuse (Dasgupta,
1995). For example, it is often the case that land that is (de
jure) property of the government is (de facto) managed and
used through customary, collective, community-based rules
of use, access, and exclusion.
Similarly, the term ‘‘grabbing” needs etymological and ana-
lytical clarification. The concept of ‘‘land grabbing,” which is
evocative of historical colonial dynamics, has become widely
used to describe processes associated with the recent expansion
in transnational land acquisitions. The term has been widely
used by NGOs, activists, international organizations, media
outlets, and scholars (Borras & Franco, 2010; Borras, Hall,
Scoones, White, & Wolford, 2011; Zoomers, Gekker, &
Scha¨fer, 2016). The International Land Coalition (ILC), a glo-
bal alliance of civil society and intergovernmental organiza-
tions with 152 institutional members in 54 countries, defines
land grabbing as LSLAs or concessions that are not transpar-
ent; violate human rights; do not seek free, prior, and
informed consent; disregard social, economic, and environ-
mental impacts; or are not based on democratic planning
and participation (International Land Coalition, 2011).
However, a problem with the term land grabbing is that it is
normative and politically charged and refers to a phenomenon
that can be assessed very differently according to different per-
spectives and interests. An LSLA could be described, for
example, from a mainstream development perspective as a
needed form of investment and technological and economic
progress, while from a critical perspective, it could be depicted
as a case of dispossession of local land users and eradication of
a traditional system of production. A fundamental question,
then, is when and according to which definition can a LSLA
be labeled as a land grab? In several instances, LSLAs are per-
fectly legal, but the process and dynamics of acquisition are
characterized by injustice and illegal actions (Kaag &
Zoomers, 2014; Zoomers et al., 2016). Therefore, the discus-
sion on when land deals are cases of grabbing is open
(Holmen, 2015; Rulli & D’Odorico, 2013; Scoones, Hall,
Borras, White, & Wolford, 2013), and, while global records
of LSLAs are available (GRAIN, 2012; The Land Matrix,
2015; Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009), their assessment
in terms of human rights violations, corruption, social and
environmental impacts, and informed consent still needs to
be addressed through a detailed case-by-case analysis.
Another reason that ‘‘LSLA” and ‘‘land grab” should not
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refers to acquisition for commercial agricultural purposes,
the latter has also been used to refer to acquisition for other
purposes, such as mining and industry (e.g., Graef, 2013), as
well as for ecotourism and conservation, a phenomenon also
referred to as ‘‘green grabbing” (The Journal of Peasant
Studies, 2012).
We are aware of the different interpretations that different
authors have of these terms, and the fact that the two terms
have often been equated in the literature. For this reason,
despite the fundamental conceptual differences, we incorpo-
rated both terms in our systematic literature review and came
up with a collection of cases that are a good representation of
the current state of the debate on the contemporary global
land rush. To contribute to this definitional discussion, we
provide a multidimensional but simple framework that
describes the notion of ‘‘grabbed commons” (Figure 1).
Our framework focuses the analysis of commons-grabbing
on three dimensions. The first dimension is related to a
broader interpretation of the different institutional regimes
and looks at the types of claims and property systems that
are present. The second dimension highlights the centrality
of the system of production, ranging from subsistence/small-
scale to commercial/speculative. The third dimension
acknowledges coercion as a constitutive signal of the presence
of commons grabbing. We think that there is a high likelihood
that commons grabbing occurs when LSLAs involve land that
is subject to multiple access and/or property rights, when this
occurs with unbalanced power dynamics between investors
and prior land users, which are often manifested through dif-
ferent levels of coercion, and entails a transition from subsis-
tence farming and/or small-scale uses of natural resources to
large-scale commercial agriculture and/or speculative invest-
ments.2. METHODS
Synthesis studies and meta-study approaches are increas-
ingly used to address global and regional patterns of social-
environmental change (Magliocca, Rudel, & Verburg, 2015;
Rudel, 2008), because they draw from empirical evidence toFigure 1. Multidimensional definidentify patterns or causal mechanisms that contribute to the-
ory building (Oberlack & Eisenack, 2014). In the emerging
arena of studies on LSLAs and the recent global land rush,
there is a great deal of controversy on the coherence and rigor
of the available data (Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013) while there is
a clear need for more research (Liao, Jung, Brown, &
Agrawal, 2016). One of the most comprehensive LSLA data
sets was developed by the Land Matrix initiative (The Land
Matrix, 2015), which provides information on each land deal
and has global coverage (Anseeuw, Lay, Messerli, Giger, &
Taylor, 2013), making it possible to analyze LSLA dynamics
as a global phenomenon (Rulli, Saviori, & D’Odorico, 2013;
Seaquist, Johansson, & Nicholas, 2014). It suffers, however,
from some conceptual, definitional, and methodological limi-
tations (Anseeuw et al., 2013), and information that is crucial
to the analysis of commons grabbing (e.g., property regimes,
previous systems of production, power relations, and use of
violence and conflict) is not provided.
A meta-analytical approach bridges the gap between global
(but less detailed) assessments and in-depth case studies that
cannot capture ongoing global patterns. Our approach can
be defined as a synthesis that uses mixed-meta-analytical
methods with characteristics of both variable and case-
oriented meta-analysis, such as systematic case selection and
theory-grounded coding (Magliocca et al., 2015). To identify
the case studies included in our analysis, we conducted a sys-
tematic literature review, looked for cross-references among
articles, and used the keyword search [‘‘land grab*” OR
‘‘large-scale land acquisition*”] in the Web of Science data-
base. Criteria for case inclusion were that the case was pub-
lished in a peer-reviewed journal article and the article
provided empirical information about a concrete land acquisi-
tion process. Criteria for exclusion were that the article did not
provide empirical information on specific cases of acquisition,
thus ruling out, for example, overviews, global studies, and
meta-theoretical discussions.
A final selection of 56 cases from 35 different peer-reviewed
articles was made. Our descriptive coding of the case studies
included 39 categories split across eight variables: a. Property
Systems Prior Acquisition; b. Land Use Prior Acquisition;
c. Users Prior Acquisition; d. Land Use Post Acquisition; e.
Acquirers; f. Acquisition mechanism; g. Government favoringition of commons grabbing.
4 WORLD DEVELOPMENTacquisition (Tables S1 and S2). Considering the data and
information limitations, potential literature bias, and knowl-
edge gaps associated with the recent phenomenon of global
transnational land investments, these 56 cases are not pro-
posed to be statistically representative of the phenomenon
globally. However, they are an exhaustive selection of cases
from peer-reviewed articles that well represents the current
state of the art of this frontier body of literature. In this sense,
this synthesis shows emerging patterns and associations that
would not be possible to observe without a comparative ana-
lytical approach.
For our statistical analysis we simplified the coding to
increase statistical power by minimizing the number of cate-
gories with low case counts. We reduced the variables from
eight to seven combining ‘‘users prior acquisition” and ‘‘land
use prior acquisition” into a single ‘‘land use and users com-
bined prior” variable. We also combined categories within
other variables resulting in a total of 24 categories (Tables
S3 and S4). The codes used in the analysis are described in
Table S3. To identify associations between categorical vari-
ables, we produced contingency tables for all pairs of variables
(21 pairs). We used Fisher’s exact test to account for the low
number of cases (<5) in some categories. Applying a Bonfer-
roni correction for multiple comparisons, we set the p-value
threshold for individual tests to 0.002 to ensure an overall sig-
nificance level of 0.05. In addition to the significance level, we
reported Cramer’s V as a measure of the strength of associa-
tion. This statistical analysis was performed in R (R Core
Team, 2015) using the ‘‘vcd” package (Meyer, Zeileis, &
Hornik, 2014).
Based on the significant pairwise associations found, we
then performed a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)
(Ragin, 1987; Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) to identify co-
occurrence relationships involving more than two variables,
using the ‘‘QCA” package in R (Dusa & Thiem, 2014). With
a small to moderate sample size, QCA provides a favorable
alternative to regression-based methods (e.g., logistic regres-
sion) to study the structure of interactions between multiple
categorical variables. Taking each level of a categorical vari-
able as a binary (0 or 1) indicator, QCA finds simplified logical
expressions that predict the presence of one category (the out-
come) based on all others (the conditions). Each logical
expression is associated with an inclusion or consistency score
(the proportion of cases in which the conditions are present
that show the predicted outcome) as well as a coverage score
(the proportion of cases in which the outcome is present that
match these particular conditions). In our QCA analysis, we
produced two types of solution: a parsimonious solution,
which finds the minimal logical relationships between condi-
tions and outcome within our sample, and a complex solution,
which is more conservative as it excludes any inference about
combinations of conditions that are not found in the sample.3. RESULTS
Informed by political economy and political ecology per-
spectives (Agrawal, 2005; Borras et al., 2011; Clement, 2010;
Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010; Ribot & Peluso, 2003),
we have identified different dimensions of analysis that charac-
terize the dynamics of LSLAs in the cases included in our
study (Figure 2). We analyzed social, institutional, and land-
use change dimensions reported in these studies by looking
at the main features of the acquisition dynamics. We focused
on the conditions characterizing the production system both
before and after the acquisition. Based on this assessment,we found that, in 63% of the cases, small-scale farming was
the main system of production before the acquisition. Use of
forests for timber and non-timber products and benefits from
other ecosystem services were reported in 21% of the cases,
and traditional pastoralist activities were indicated in 21% of
the cases. 1 The main users affected by the land acquisitions
were described as smallholders (in 61% of the cases), indige-
nous people (20% of the cases), pastoralists (16%), or commer-
cial farmers (5%). The analysis of property systems revealed
that in 55% of the cases, acquisitions happened in the presence
of common-property regimes; in 13% of the cases, the authors
explicitly reported cases of legal pluralism (i.e., coexistence of
different kinds of property regimes); the land was described in
11% of the cases as state land and in 5% as private property.
In 61% of the cases, the acquired land was designated for
large-scale production of crops as food, while in 36% of the
cases, the land was acquired for crops for non-food uses, such
as biofuels; extensive ranching and logging were reported in
9%and 5%of the cases, respectively, while altogether, industrial
and real estate development accounted for 9% of the cases. For-
eign private companies were themain actors in 54%of the cases,
domestic private companies in 29%, domestic–foreign joint ven-
tures in 16%, and government–private partnerships in 13%. The
acquisitions took place through different mechanisms: preva-
lently through government leases (54% of the cases) but also
through broader government and titling policies (29%) and
direct or indirect purchase (21%); other factors such as market
pressures also have played a role in some land transactions
(16% of the cases). In a large majority of the cases (89%), the
national government favored the acquisition.
Finally, we identified different typologies of coercion, using
the categories of a. coercion without manifested conflicts, b.
coercion with non-violent conflict, and c. coercion with violent
conflict. Coercion in this context can be understood as a sys-
tem of practices and mechanisms that directly or indirectly
influence through varying degrees of use of force, the possibil-
ity of the local land users to keep control of their land and nat-
ural resources. Coercion in land acquisitions can be observed
both through explicit power imbalances and absence of safe-
guards for more vulnerable actors or by different signals such
as the ones produced by conflicts with or without violence.
Following this categorization, we identified coercion without
manifested conflicts when the acquisition happened taking
advantage of a clear power imbalance, consent by the previous
users was not reported or cases of corruption were reported,
but the acquisition did not lead to manifested conflicts. This
was coded for 34% of the cases. Coercion with non-violent
conflicts, defined as explicit confrontation between the differ-
ent actors involved in the acquisition, ranging from protest
to physical but not violent resistance, for 25%; and coercion
with violent conflict (involving violent confrontation or
oppression that resulted in violent physical actions) for 23%.
In the remaining cases (18%) the articles reviewed did not
report information on any coercion dynamics.
(a) Grabbed commons
In order to apply our multidimensional definition of
grabbed commons (Figure 2), we applied a trivariate filter that
required the coexistence of multiple claims (common-property
regimes, legal pluralism, and public land), small-scale farming
(based on both the land use pre-acquisition and users affected),
and coercion (including coercion without manifested conflicts,
coercion with non-violent conflict, and coercion with violent
conflict). Of the 56 cases, 44 exhibited these three characteris-
tics and thus can be defined as grabbed commons. Further, the
Conflict no.viol. (14)
Conflict w.viol. (13)
Not reported (10)
Coerc.no.conflict (19)
Yes (50)
Unclear  (6)
Purchase (12)
Gov. Lease (30)
Gov. Titling/Policy (16)
Market Press./Other (9)
Domestic Co. (16)
Foreign Co. (30)
Dom.−For. Venture (9)
Government (2)
Gov.−Priv. Venture (7)
Other  (1)
Food Crops (34)
Non−Food Crops (20)
Ranching (5)
Logging (3)
Ind. & Mining (2)
Real Estate (3)
Other (3)
Smallholders (34)
Indig. People (11)
Pastoralists (9)
Commercial Farmers (3)
Squatters (2)
Gatherers (1)
Fishers (3)
Small Farm (35)
Forest & Eco.Serv. (12)
Pastoralism (12)
Common Prop. Reg. (31)
Legal Pluralism (7)
State Land (6)
Private Prop. (3)
Legal Vacuum (5)
Unclear (5)
Coercion
Gov. Favoring Acq.
Acq. Mechanism
Acquirers
Land Use Post−Acq.
Users Affected
Land Use Pre−Acq.
Property System
1007550250
Percentage of studies
Figure 2. Frequency distribution of each categorical variable over the 56 case studies.
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analysis (Figure 3) highlighted the share of cases in which a
category occurred in conjunction with another category.
Focusing on the acquisition mechanisms, in 21 of the 30
cases involving a government lease (i.e., 70%), the land was
in a common-property regime prior to acquisition (Fig-
ure 3A). In 27 of the 29 cases of government leases for which
the land use after the acquisition was reported (i.e., 93%), the
land was designated for crop production, the exceptions being
1 case each of ranching and nonagricultural use. In 7 of the 12
cases involving land purchases (i.e., 58%), the acquisition was
for crop production, in 3 cases (25%) for ranching, and in 5
cases (42%) for nonagricultural use such as logging, industry,
or mining (Figure 3B).
Regarding the relationship between coercion and acquisition
mechanisms (Figure 3C), conflict with violence was only pre-
sent in cases of government lease, occurring in 13 of 30 (43%)
of such cases, while conflict without violence was mentioned
in 5 of 12 (42%) cases involving purchase and 9 of 30 (39%)
cases involving government leases (Figure 3C). Regarding the
relationship between coercion and property regime prior to
acquisition, 9 of 13 (70%) of the cases of conflict with violence
and 7 of 14 (50%) of the cases of conflict without violence hap-
pened when the regime was common property (Figure 3D).
Common-property regimes were also reported in 12 of 19
(63%) of the cases of coercion without manifested conflicts.
The analysis of pairwise contingency tables (Figure 3)
showed significant associations only between acquisitionmechanism and land use after acquisition (p = 0.0006, Cra-
mer’s V = 0.38) and between acquisition mechanism and coer-
cion (p < 105, Cramer’s V = 0.44). Government leases
constituted the primary mechanism of land acquisition for
agriculture, while government policies or titling were more
prevalent for nonagricultural uses (Figure 3B). Government
leases were involved in all cases for which coercion with vio-
lent conflicts were reported, whereas no overt conflicts were
reported in cases where the land was acquired through govern-
ment policies or titling and market pressures. Coercion with-
out manifested conflicts, however, occurred in combination
with all of the acquisition mechanisms (Figure 3C).(b) Qualitative comparative analysis
Since the above results highlight the existence of a signifi-
cant relationship between post-acquisition land use, acquisi-
tion mechanism, and coercion, we performed a QCA to
determine the specific conditions that, according to our data -
set, lead to manifested conflictual outcomes. All categories of
post-acquisition land use and acquisition mechanism were
used as conditions, whereas a binary outcome variable was
defined as the presence of conflict by aggregating the ‘‘conflict
with violence” and ‘‘conflict without violence” categories (27
out of the 56 cases). The QCA truth table (Table 1) includes
19 distinct combinations of conditions from the case studies
and their associated outcomes.
Figure 3. Spine plots of the binary relationships between acquisition mechanisms and (A) property regime before the acquisition, (B) land use after the
acquisition; (C) and coercion; and (D) property regimes before the acquisition and coercion. Numbers on axis labels and in plot indicate how many studies
were associated which each category and each pair of categories, respectively.
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mative (conflict) and negative (no conflict) outcomes (Tables
2A and 2B, respectively). The parsimonious solution for the
affirmative case indicates that conflict (with violence and
without violence) occurs when (a) government lease is the
sole acquisition mechanism (22 cases, 82% of conflict cases)
or (b) the land is used for crops and purchase is the sole
acquisition mechanism (4 cases, 15% of conflict cases). The
complex solution includes additional terms in order to avoid
making assumptions about (i.e., excluding) combinations of
categories that do not appear in the sample. Its first two
terms expand condition (b) above to exclude cases where
purchase is the sole acquisition mechanism and all three
types of land use (crops, ranching, and nonagricultural use)
are present. Its last term adds crops as a supplementary con-
dition to condition (a), excluding cases where government
lease is the sole acquisition mechanism and no crops are pre-
sent. The parsimonious solution for the negative case shows
that no conflict arises if the land is acquired through govern-
ment titles or policies (16 cases, 55% of no-conflict cases),market pressure (9 cases, 31% of no-conflict cases), or a com-
bination of government lease and purchase (4 cases, 14% of
no-conflict cases). The complex solution includes additional
terms that enumerate the types of post-acquisition land use
associated with each of the acquisition mechanisms in our
set of cases.
The parsimonious QCA solutions, both affirmative and neg-
ative, correctly describe the outcome in all but 3 of the 56
cases, for total inclusion and coverage scores ranging from
93% to 100%. For this collection of case studies, the occur-
rence of conflict (violent or not) can thus be determined almost
exclusively based on the acquisition mechanism and, to a lesser
extent, the post-acquisition land use.4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Some scholars writing about ‘‘land grabs” today analogize
to earlier large-scale ‘‘land reforms” that privatized previously
unowned, common, or ‘‘waste” lands (Cotula, 2013; White,
Table 1. QCA truth table
CROPS RANCHING NON.AG PURCHASE GOV.LEASE GOV.TITL.POL MARK.PRESS OUT n Incl
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 C 2 0.5
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 23 0.957
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 1
Conditions: all types of Land Use post-acquisition and all types of acquisition mechanisms.
OUT = Outcome (1 = Conflict, 0 = No conflict, C = Contradiction).
N = number of cases.
Incl = sufficiency inclusion score (threshold set at 0.95).
Table 2A. Results of the qualitative comparative analysis with ‘‘Conflict” as outcome (Broadly, includes ‘‘Conflict with violence” and :‘‘Conflict without
violence” codes)
Inclusion Coverage
Complex solution
1 CROPS*non.ag*PURCHASE*gov.lease*gov.titl.pol*mark.press 1.000 0.111
2 CROPS*ranching*PURCHASE*gov.lease*gov.titl.pol*mark.press 1.000 0.074
3 CROPS*ranching*non.ag*purchase*GOV.LEASE*gov.titl.pol*mark.press 0.957 0.815
0.963 0.963
Parsimonious solution
1 purchase*GOV.LEASE*gov.titl.pol*mark.press 0.957 0.815
2 CROPS*PURCHASE*gov.lease*gov.titl.pol*mark.press 1.000 0.148
0.963 0.963
Table 2B. Results of the qualitative comparative analysis with ‘‘No Conflict” as outcome
Inclusion Coverage
Complex solution
1 CROPS*non.ag*purchase*gov.lease*MARK.PRESS 1.000 0.310
2 ranching*NON.AG*purchase*gov.lease*GOV.TITL.POL*mark.press 1.000 0.207
3 CROPS*ranching*non.ag*gov.lease*GOV.TITL.POL*mark.press 1.000 0.138
4 ranching*non.ag*purchase*GOV.LEASE*GOV.TITL.POL*mark.press 1.000 0.103
5 CROPS*ranching*non.ag*PURCHASE*GOV.LEASE*gov.titl.pol*mark.press 1.000 0.069
6 crops*ranching*NON.AG*PURCHASE*GOV.LEASE*gov.titl.pol*mark.press 1.000 0.034
7 crops*RANCHING*non.ag*PURCHASE*GOV.LEASE*gov.titl.pol*mark.press 1.000 0.034
8 crops*ranching*NON.AG*PURCHASE*gov.lease*GOV.TITL.POL*mark.press 1.000 0.034
1.000 0.931
Parsimonious solution
1 GOV.TITL.POL 1.000 0.552
2 MARK.PRESS 1.000 0.310
3 PURCHASE*GOV.LEASE 1.000 0.138
1.000 0.931
Uppercase names denote the presence of a category and lowercase names denote its absence; ‘‘*” represents a logical ‘‘AND”. The inclusion (‘‘incl.”) and
coverage (‘‘cov.”) scores are defined in the Methods. Outcome: Conflict (broadly, includes ‘‘Conflict with violence” and ‘‘Conflict without violence” codes).
Conditions: categories of Land Use Post, Acquisition Mechanism.
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8 WORLD DEVELOPMENTBorras, Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012; Wily, 2013). The first
known, and most extensively studied, such privatization was
the enclosure movement that began in England in the 15th
century alongside an increase in sheep ranching and commer-
cial farming, which required the enclosure of open fields
(Curtler, 1920). By the 17th century, enclosure was a large-
scale operation almost invariably undertaken pursuant to acts
of Parliament. Those acts were always promoted by large
landholders, and operated to the detriment of commoners,
turning many users of the commons into trespassers and, ulti-
mately, criminals. The enclosure movement in England has
often been cited as an example of a large-scale institutional
change that made possible higher levels of economic growth
because of the superior incentives to production and conserva-
tion provided by private and individual ownership of land
(Cole, 2001; North & Weingast, 1989), though this economic
efficiency hypothesis has been challenged (Allen, 1994). The
legal reforms associated with the enclosure movement directly
contributed to the commodification of land (Polanyi, 1944), a
process that subordinated social relations and the natural
environment to the economic system (Cotula, 2013). Putting
the current global land rush in a historical perspective shows
continuities and contrasts with past land rushes such as those
associated with the colonial experience, and the historic trend
in dispossession of native populations across the world and
across centuries (White et al., 2012; Wily, 2012).
While generalizations and historical analogies are parlous,
our synthesis highlights some patterns that can better serve
the understanding of how the global land rush represents ‘‘a
new frontier in historical shifts between social embeddedness
and commodification in land relations” (Cotula, 2013, p. 1623):
1. The ongoing LSLAs are associated with a change in pro-
duction system, from subsistence and smallholding to com-
mercial farming, that entails fundamental social
transformations.
2. LSLAs preferentially target common land and land with
multiple access and use claims and turn that land into pri-
vate property or concessions for the exclusive use of the
investors.
3. Acquisitions are generally characterized by imbalanced
power relations, and they are not conflict free. The degree
of conflict varies through different forms of coercion, such
as when deals are closed without the informed consent of
previous land users, who are excluded from the negotiation
process, not adequately informed about the implications of
these acquisitions, or evicted and forced off the land which
is often associated with instances of physical violence.
Building on these three elements, we assessed that according
to the literature, commons grabbing is a constitutive part of
the global agrarian transformation associated with expansion
of LSLAs. The majority of the land acquisitions considered in
this study (44 of 56) could be considered cases of commons
grabbing. Moreover, most of the cases of conflict (including
violent and non-violent conflict) emerged when the land was
acquired through government lease, and such leases were
mainly for large-scale crop production.
This is a reason for concern, as the transformation of com-
munal land access, ownership, use, and property regimes that
are produced by LSLAs can negatively affect local communi-
ties and vulnerable groups (Anseeuw et al., 2013; De
Schutter, 2011a, 2011b; Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen,
2010). Critics have pointed out that this is correlated with a
process of dispossession, transformation of social networks,
increase in conflict, and loss of livelihood strategies, assets,
traditional knowledge, environmental stewardship, food secu-
rity, and productive opportunities (Claeys, 2013; Davis,D’Odorico, & Rulli, 2014; De Schutter, 2011a, 2011b;
D’Odorico & Rulli, 2013; Rulli & D’Odorico, 2013, 2014).
The emergence of the commons-grabbing phenomenon
highlights an element important for commons theory:
common-property regimes and commons systems of gover-
nance that have successfully managed natural common-pool
resources might be undermined by the expansion of LSLAs.
The original argument that the commons can be governed sus-
tainably under common-property regimes and associated tra-
ditional institutions (Ostrom, 1990) does not account for the
emergence of such external drivers with increased globaliza-
tion. While these institutions can be resilient with respect to
endogenous drivers, they become vulnerable to exogenous fac-
tors such as the imposition of new systems of production and
associated transformations in power relations.
Factors that historically contributed to the strength of the
commons may now increase its vulnerability to the new drivers
of globalization (Lambin et al., 2001). The uses, claims, and
values that traditional users, rural communities and indige-
nous people attach to land and its resources are often in con-
trast with the commodification associated with expansion of
LSLAs (Brondizio & Le Tourneau, 2016; Cotula, 2013;
Wily, 2011a, 2011b). For instance, the absence of formally
defined private property rights, which historically would have
prevented the land from being sold and would have allowed
communities to transfer assets held in common to subsequent
generations (Deveroux, 2001), can now work against the inter-
ests of the communities. Commons users can be excluded from
the negotiation of LSLAs because they do not have formal
property rights to defend (D’Odorico & Rulli, 2014); but at
the same time, formalization and land titling might open the
way to new dynamics of land commodification.
Similarly, commons users may be in a weaker position
because they have no access to credit, since they cannot use
the land as collateral for borrowing (Hanrja, Ferede, &
Gemechu Gutta, 2009). This power imbalance emerges when
a traditional system of production needs to compete with
new economic models (De Schutter, 2011a). Moreover, the
appearance of other exogenous forces that transform the value
of land may render some communal land particularly appeal-
ing to investors. For example, the expansion of railways and
roads has historically increased the value of land and
expanded the frontier of acquisition, as in the cases of Mexico,
Bolivia, and Guatemala (Grandia, 2013). Likewise, the recent
global food and water crises have spurred interest in agribusi-
ness investments in potentially productive but underperform-
ing agricultural land close to watercourses (Anseeuw, Wily,
Cotula, & Taylor, 2012).
LSLAs are carried out in various ways, with a variety of
proximate and distal causes (Messerli, Giger, Dwyer, Breu,
& Eckert, 2014; Scheidel & Sorman, 2012), and are often
responsible for the transformation and redefinition of land
regimes through both formal and informal routes (Adnan,
2013; Lavers, 2012a, 2012b). Formal mechanisms are typically
based on seemingly legal changes in land ownership and land
rights, whereas informal mechanisms often result from the
emergence of new power relationships among the main actors
and stakeholders (e.g., the state, investors, and local commu-
nities) (Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010), which rely
on a different ‘‘bundle of powers” rather than just on property
rights (Ribot & Peluso, 2003).
A critical aspect of LSLAs is that they imply that land is
commodified, and sold or leased for speculation purposes. This
fact is partly evidenced by the number of cases in which the
acquired land is not developed by the investors but kept fallow,
presumably waiting to be sold once land prices rise (D’Odorico
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Polanyi, 1944) makes the land a commodity exploited by
broader groups of users, often with profit maximization objec-
tives (D’Odorico & Rulli, 2013; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones,
2012). This, in cases of transnational land investments, might
impact long-term sustainability as the management of the
resources may be driven by short-term economic considera-
tions rather than by local land stewardship. Institutions that
had historically allowed for a responsible governance of the
commons are quickly dismantled, and local communities lose
their most fundamental asset. The introduction of a speculative
use of natural resources breaks the ethical link between the
land and its people, leading to a loss of local environmental
stewardship (D’Odorico & Rulli, 2013).
The multidimensional approach proposed here allows us to
emphasize that the losses of rural livelihoods and environmen-
tal stewardship resulting from LSLAs or broader dynamics of
land grabbing cannot be prevented by acting only on property
regimes without addressing power dynamics and systems of
production. Monodimensional approaches such as formaliza-
tion of property rights, land titling, or privatization, which
echo Hardin’s argument about the tragedy of the commons
(de Soto, 2000; Hardin, 1968; World Bank, 1989), do not
account for power imbalances and may not be applicable to
traditional systems of production. Indeed, legal instruments
developed in capitalistic systems of production (e.g., formaliza-
tion of titles or legal protections) may be inadequate to sustain
subsistence systems based on common-property regimes.
Securing land titles through legislative reform or formalization
of property is complicated and runs the risk of producing unin-
tended consequences. Property rights are dynamic and change
over time, and simplistic approaches to tenure security do not
allow an effective response to complex power dynamics and
interactions between opposing claims (Behrman, Meinzen-
Dick, & Quisumbing, 2012; Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, 2001).
Systems of production such as pastoralism, which is prac-
ticed by between 200 and 500 million people worldwide
(McGahery, Davies, Hagelberg, & Ouedraogo, 2014), are par-
ticularly affected by commons grabbing. Pastoralist societies
that have historically been in conflict with state forms of gover-
namentality (Dell’Angelo, 2013; Derman, Odgaard, &
Sjaastad, 2007; Humphrey & Sneath, 1999; Scott, 1998) are a
clear example of how moving from a theory of property to a
theory of access is fundamental to understanding and develop-
ing policies that relate to non rural, community based or indige-
nous systems of production (Ribot & Peluso, 2003).
Considering the transhumant characteristic of traditional pas-
toralist systems and the adaptive nature of these practices and
the extension of their mobility, what matters for pastoralists is
the ability to access pastures rather than the property right to a
specific piece of land. The extension of forms of privateproperty to these systems has been historically associated with
a process of sedentarization, which can result in the eradication
of their traditional system of production and associated culture.
Finally, the results of our analysis highlight the importance
of the role of the state—which is not a homogenous entity oper-
ating coherently on LSLAs. There are multifaceted differences
in terms of sovereignty, authority, actors, institutions, prac-
tices, and discourses among and between countries (Wolford,
Borras, Hall, Scoones, & White, 2013). However, our analysis
identified a clear pattern emerging from the different studies:
Governments favored acquisition in most of the cases and were
directly responsible for allocation of leases and concessions, the
main acquisition mechanisms. Our analysis points out that
conflict, which is a main determinant for the identification of
the grabbed commons, is prevalently associated with the gov-
ernmental lease as the main mechanism of acquisition.
This synthesis highlights the involvement of governments in
transnational land acquisitions, and it is consistent with the
idea that governments have a fundamental role in facilitating
land commodification through formal law and/or coercion
(Cotula, 2013). This implies that commons grabbing is a phe-
nomenon happening with a direct government intervention in
these types of investments, and it supports the assertion that
there is an ongoing process of global agricultural restructuring
that favors large-scale over small-scale agriculture (Amanor,
2012). As highlighted by the results of our QCA, this restruc-
turing is raising different levels of conflicts. While conflicts
over land and water can be related to a variety of explanatory
factors—including tenure changes, issues of identity and eth-
nicity, hydro-climatic change and scarcity, and politico-
economic drivers (Barnett & Adger, 2007; Bebbington, 2011;
Derman et al., 2007; Humphreys, 2005; Kallis & Zografos,
2013; Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, May, & Haglund, 2013; Wolf,
2007)—our analysis highlights a clear association between
the global land rush and the emergence of conflicts.
Without policies that take into account the multiple and
diverging values (Cotula, 2013) of different societies, commu-
nity systems of production will continue to be undermined
and subject to dispossession by large-scale land investments
and acquisitions. The problem should be redressed either with
legal reforms aiming at strengthening common-property
regimes (Wily, 2011a, 2011b) or by developing alternatives
to these investments (De Schutter, 2011a, 2011b; German
et al., 2013). Policy-makers and international organizations
have been increasingly discussing and addressing these issues
(FAO, 2012; FAO, IIED, & IFAD, 2009; International
Land Coalition, 2011; World Bank, 2011). But finding solu-
tions that are effective and that reconcile competing interests
on multiple governance levels will not be easy, and global
panaceas are likely not the solution (Ostrom, Janssen, &
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